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Abstract Cooperation among non-kin has been attributed
sometimes to reciprocal altruism: Two or more individuals
exchange behaviour that benefits the respective partner.
According to direct reciprocity, cooperation is based on past
behaviour of a known partner. In contrast, in generalised
reciprocity, cooperation is based on anonymous social
experience where the identity of the partner is irrelevant.
In a previous study, female Norway rats (Rattus norvegicus)
were found to cooperate according to a generalised
reciprocity mechanism. In this study, we tested whether
Norway rats would also cooperate as predicted by a direct
reciprocity mechanism and whether direct reciprocity
would cause a higher propensity to cooperate than
generalised reciprocity. Focal animals were experimentally
manipulated to receive social experience from known or
unknown, helpful or defecting partners in an instrumental
cooperative task. Our first experiment shows that rats are
more helpful towards a partner from which they had
received help before than towards a partner that had not
helped (i.e. direct reciprocity). Our second experiment
revealed that after receiving help by others, rats were more
helpful towards a partner from which they had received
help before than towards a new partner (i.e. direct
reciprocity generated a higher cooperation propensity than
generalised reciprocity). We conclude that in female Nor-
way rats, the tendency to cooperate is influenced by
partner-specific information. To our knowledge, this is the
first study to demonstrate direct reciprocity in rodents, and
it is the first study testing direct vs generalised reciprocity
in animals.
Keywords Cooperation . Reciprocal altruism . Cognition .
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Introduction
Among evolutionary mechanisms responsible for coopera-
tion, reciprocal altruism has achieved particular interest
(Trivers 1971; Alexander 1987; Nowak and Sigmund
2005). The logic of reciprocal altruism is that the decision
to pay some cost for the benefit of another individual is
based on expected future help, which may be judged from
past interactions. Theoretical models suggest that reciprocal
altruism is either based on information about a particular
partner’s propensity to cooperate (direct reciprocity: Axelrod
and Hamilton 1981; indirect reciprocity: Nowak and
Sigmund 1998, 2005; Leimar and Hammerstein 2001) or
on anonymous cooperative experience with any partner
(upstream tit-for-tat: Boyd and Richerson 1989; generalised
reciprocity: Hamilton and Taborsky 2005; Pfeiffer et al.
2005). According to direct reciprocity, A helps B because B
has helped A before (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981). So far,
experimental evidence for strategies predicted by direct
reciprocity models is limited and has been often disputed
(Wilkinson 1984; Milinski et al. 1990; Dugatkin and Alfieri
1991; Godard 1993; Clements and Stephens 1995; Stephens
et al. 1997; Barrett et al. 2000; de Waal and Berger 2000;
Krams and Krama 2002; Hauser et al. 2003; Olendorf et al.
2004). Indirect reciprocity, where A helps B because B has
helped C before, which is information available to A, has
been demonstrated only in humans (Wedekind and Milinski
2000; Milinski et al. 2001; Semmann et al. 2005), but see
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Bshary and Grutter (2006) for a possible example at the
inter-specific level in fish. According to generalised reci-
procity, A helps B because A had received help from C
before, where the identities of B and C are unimportant
(Hamilton and Taborsky 2005; Pfeiffer et al. 2005).
Generalised reciprocity has been demonstrated to work in
humans and Norway rats (Berkowitz and Daniels 1964;
Rutte and Taborsky 2007).
To acquire the necessary information about a partner’s
likelihood to reciprocate, direct and indirect reciprocity
demand that animals possess specific cognitive abilities
(Stevens and Hauser 2004). For example, to play tit-for-tat,
a prominent strategy found to establish cooperation in
direct reciprocity models, an animal must recognise its
social partner and recall what this individual had done in a
previous interaction (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981). Even if
animals are able to recognise conspecifics individually and
to remember their behaviour, this may be difficult or costly
(Milinski and Wedekind 1998), for example in large groups
or when time intervals between mutual interactions are
long. This may be one important reason that evidence for
direct reciprocity in animals is much more limited than
expected from theoretical considerations (Stevens et al.
2005). However, given the required biological and social
conditions, direct reciprocity may indeed cause animals to
cooperate, even if presently this mechanism may appear to
be limited to primates, with few exceptions (Hauser et al.
2003). In this study, we compare the influence of
individual-specific and anonymous cooperation experience
on the propensity to cooperate in female Norway rats
(Rattus norvegicus), as this species may fulfil the precon-
ditions to cooperate according to direct reciprocity.
Norway rats are able to recognise conspecifics individ-
ually by odour (Gheusi 1997) and usually live in groups
from only a few up to 200 individuals, among which,
relatedness levels may vary greatly (Telle 1966). In
addition, rats show a propensity to cooperate (Schuster
2002; Schuster and Perelberg 2004). In a previous study,
we found that anonymous cooperative experience influen-
ces a rat’s propensity to help others: A rat that was helped
before by anonymous partners is more helpful towards a
new partner than a rat that had received no help
(generalised reciprocity; Rutte and Taborsky 2007). When
testing for direct reciprocity, one needs to exclude the
possibility that any positive effect of received cooperation
on the propensity to help a partner would have been caused
also by anonymous cooperation experience (i.e. general-
ised reciprocity) instead of individual-specific experience. In
other words, we had to test the direct reciprocity paradigm
also against a setup allowing for generalised reciprocity. In a
two-step procedure, we used female rats that were not closely
related and had been trained in an instrumental cooperative
task (1) to test whether rats discriminate between a cooperator
and a non-cooperator (defector) by showing direct reciprocity
and (2) to compare the cooperative propensity of rats towards
a partner that had helped them before (direct reciprocity) with
that shown towards a new partner after experiencing help
from others (generalised reciprocity).
Materials and methods
Subjects
The rats were bred from outbred wild-type rats (source:
Animal Physiology Department, University of Groningen,
Netherlands) and housed with same-sex littermates in groups
of three to seven in cages (80×50×37.5 cm). We used only
female rats because the dominance relationship among
females is rather egalitarian compared to a marked hierarchy
among males (own unpublished data). Female groups could
not interact with each other between cages due to the
arrangement of cages. The housing room had an average
temperature of 22°C and a 12:12-h light/dark cycle with
lights on at 20:00 hours. Food (conventional rat pellets) and
water were provided ad libitum. Fresh vegetables (salad,
carrots) were additionally provided twice a week. Rats are
predominantly nocturnal, and we thus performed our experi-
ments during the dark phase in the morning hours.
Pre-experimental training
The experimental setup (Fig. 1a) was similar to that used in
tests of cooperative behaviour in primates (De Waal and
Berger 2000; Hauser et al. 2003). The training of the rats in
the instrumental cooperative task consisted of two steps.
First, a single rat learned to pull a stick fixed to a baited
platform to move it into the cage and reach the reward (one
oat flake). Second, this rat learned to pull alternately with a
littermate, providing access to food for each other. For this,
the two rats were placed in a cage that was separated into
two compartments by a wire mesh. Only one rat had access
to the stick and the opportunity to move the baited platform
into the cage. The pulling rat had no access to the reward,
but only its partner. In a subsequent session, the roles were
exchanged. Initially, the partners pulled shortly after each
other (i.e. one partner had to pull four times, then the roles
were exchanged immediately). The interval between the
exchanges of roles was gradually increased to 2 days. All
rats pulled in this cooperative situation. We assume that the
focal rats in our experimental setup recognised that the
partners were different individuals, as in another experi-
ment, we found that the duration of investigative behaviour
(sniffing) by rats towards a familiar and unfamiliar partner
differed significantly in a similar situation (own unpub-
lished data). The duration of investigative behaviour
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towards a conspecific is an adequate method to demonstrate
discrimination between familiar and unfamiliar individuals
(Gheusi et al. 1994).
Experiments
In the experiments, only rats were paired that came from
different cages (i.e. they were not closely related). In the
first experiment (Fig. 1b), 13 focal rats alternately received
help from one partner to get food (cooperator treatment)
and no help from another partner (non-cooperator treat-
ment). In this experience phase, each focal rat met each
partner five times in a random sequence over a period of 20
days. In total, five helping partners that had been trained in
alternated pulling were used (two were used twice, three
were used three times; individual partner rats were not
treated differently by the test rats in the subsequent test:
Kruskal–Wallis analysis of variance (ANOVA), df=4, χ2=
6.391, p=0.172). As an incentive to pull, each helping
partner had been rewarded for pulling shortly before the
focal rat was put into the second compartment of the
experimental cage. The session continued until the partner
had pulled eight times, which, on average, was achieved
within 7 min. Each time, the focal rat would receive one
oat flake on the tray. The non-helping partners (in total
seven; six were used twice; individual partner rats were not
treated differently by the test rats in the subsequent test:
Kruskal–Wallis ANOVA, df=5, χ2=3.647, p=0.601) had
not been trained in pulling, and therefore, did not try to do
so. As an additional security measure, the platform was
mechanically prevented from moving towards the cage.
Again, the duration of a trial was 7 min. During each non-
cooperator session, the experimenter also baited the tray
eight times with one oat flake on the side of the focal rat.
After each session, the partner rat was removed first, and
then the focal rat received the eight oat flakes on the tray.
Note that during the entire experience phase (20 days), the
focal rat did not pull herself at any stage. After the end of
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Fig. 1 Rats cooperate in an instrumental task. a Experimental setup
and pre-experimental training. Two rats in the test cage are separated
by a wire mesh; by pulling a stick fixed to a baited tray, one rat
produces food for the partner rat, but is not rewarded herself for this
behaviour. Subsequently, the roles are exchanged and the rat that had
received a reward before is now in the role of the potential cooperator.
b First experiment. The focal rat (black) alternately experienced help
by a partner rat (A) that pulled (cooperator treatment), or no help by
another partner rat (B) that did not pull (non-cooperator treatment).
Subsequently, it was tested in the role of the potential helper with both
partners. c Second experiment. The focal rat (black) either repeatedly
experienced help from the same partner (A) and was subsequently
tested in the role of the potential helper with this partner (direct
reciprocity treatment), or it repeatedly received help from three
different partner rats (B, C, D) and was then tested with a new partner
(E) (generalised reciprocity treatment)
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the experience phase, each focal rat was paired with both
partners in a random sequence on 1 day and was now in the
role of the potential helper. The number of pulls performed
by the focal rat in this situation was noted during a period of
7 min. The experimenter recorded the interactions on a
monitor whilst sitting behind a gliding door. A new oat flake
was placed on the platform 10 s after each pulling event (i.e.
after the partner rat usually had consumed the food).
In the second experiment (Fig. 1c), focal rats either
repeatedly received help from the same partner and were
subsequently tested with this partner (direct reciprocity
treatment), or they received help from three different
partners and were then tested with a new partner (general-
ised reciprocity treatment). Four of the 14 focal rats had
been used as focal rats in the first experiment. Before the
experiment, each focal rat met its two respective test
partners (“cooperator” and “new partner”) on 3 days for
10 min each in a cage different from the experimental cage.
This was done to minimise the difference in familiarity
between focal rats and their test partners, which might
influence the propensity to cooperate in the test situation.
All focal rats were exposed to both treatments in a random
sequence. In both treatments, in the experience phase, the
focal rats received help on three successive days, and on
day four, they were paired, now in the role of the potential
helper, either with the same partner as in the experience
phase (direct reciprocity treatment; in total, six helping
partners that had been trained in alternated pulling were
used: one was used twice, two were used three times, one
was used four times; individual partner rats were not
treated differently by the test rats in the subsequent test:
Kruskal–Wallis ANOVA, df=3, χ2=3.991, p=0.262) or
with a new partner (generalised reciprocity treatment; in
total, five helping partners that had been trained in
alternated pulling were used (two were used twice, two
were used three times, one was used four times; individual
partner rats were treated differently by the test rats in the
subsequent test: Kruskal–Wallis ANOVA, df=4, χ2=
9.778, p=0.044).). Three days later, we repeated this
procedure by switching the experience treatment given to
the focal rats. Again, the focal rat did not pull herself in the
entire experience phase. Observations and data recording
were conducted in the same way as in the first experiment,
but in a blind fashion such that the experimenter did not
know which focal rat was in the trial. One day after this
experiment, we noted the pulling rate of each focal rat
a 
Individual
10 11 20 21 22 23 24 30 31 40 41 50 51
Pu
llin
g 
fre
qu
en
cy
 / 
m
in
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
b
Individual
10 12 24 25 26 32 42 43 50 51 60 70 80 81
Pu
llin
g 
fre
qu
en
cy
 / 
m
in
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
Fig. 2 Reciprocity in rats.
a Direct reciprocity: rats pulled
more often for a partner that had
helped before (cooperator treat-
ment, filled dots) than for a
partner that had not helped
before (non-cooperator treat-
ment, open triangles). b Direct
vs generalised reciprocity: the
pulling frequency of rats was
higher when paired with a part-
ner that had helped before (di-
rect reciprocity treatment, filled
dots) than when having received
help from others (generalised
reciprocity treatment, open tri-
angles). Numbers on the abscis-
sa with the same first digit
denote individuals from the
same family (e.g. 10, 11 and 12
were siblings), and the same
numbers in both graphs indicate
the same individual (e.g. 50 was
used in both experiments)
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when alone in the experimental cage to check for intrinsic
differences in pulling frequency. The situation was equiv-
alent to the experiment where the rat could move the
platform into the cage by pulling, but she was unable to
reach the reward, and no partner was present.
Statistics
The data were analysed with non-parametric statistics using
the software package SPSS 11.0 (SPSS, Chicago, IL,
USA). We compared treatment effects of individuals using
two-tailed Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks tests. For
analysing differences in baseline pulling frequency after the
second experiment, we used the Mann–Whitney U test.
Results
In the first experiment, rats pulled more often for a partner
that had pulled for them in previous interactions than for a
partner that had not done so (medians: cooperator treat-
ment, 1.26 pulls/min, non-cooperator treatment, 0.86 pulls/
min; n=13, Z=−2.200, p<0.05; Fig. 2a). The median
interval between placing an oat flake on the platform and
pulling by the rat was shorter in tests with the cooperator
than in tests with the non-cooperator (n=13, Z=−2.062, p<
0.05; Fig. 3a). In the second experiment, the pulling
frequency was higher for the partner that had helped before
than for a new partner after having received help from
others (medians: direct reciprocity, 1.07 pulls/min, general-
ised reciprocity, 0.71 pulls/min; n=14, Z=−1.996, p<0.05;
Fig. 2b). The median pulling delay was shorter when the
test rat was paired with a known cooperator than when
meeting a new partner who was not known from previous
cooperative interactions (n=14, Z=−2.543, p=0.01;
Fig. 3b). The baseline pulling frequency recorded 1 day
after the experiment when rats were alone in the cage was
lower than in the direct reciprocity treatment (Mann–
Whitney U test, p=0.001) and in the generalised reciprocity
treatment (Mann–Whitney U test, p=0.002), respectively,
but it did not differ significantly between the treatments
(direct reciprocity: median=0.57, n=8; generalised reci-
procity: median=0.43, n=6; U=14.0, p=0.23). Therefore,
there is no indication that the intrinsic tendency to pull had
been influenced by the experimental treatments.
Discussion
The data of our first experiment indicate that rats recip-
rocate help in this cooperative situation. To our knowledge,
this is the first experimental demonstration that animals
show direct reciprocity in an instrumental cooperative task
below the level of primates. Focal rats discriminated
between a partner that provided help and a partner that
did not and based their own helping behaviour on previous
interactions with a particular partner. Social learning as an
alternative explanation for this result is unlikely, as the
focal rats were exposed to both treatments (receiving help
and receiving no help) in an alternating sequence during the
experience phase. Thus, each focal rat was exposed to a
pulling partner and a non-pulling partner, but showed a
clear difference in her subsequent pulling behaviour
towards the two different partners. It remains to be tested
whether rats would be able to distinguish between more
than two partners. This would be interesting with respect to
their natural social system and the associated frequency of
social interactions. The strategy used by the rats may be
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Fig. 3 Reaction times. a The median delay (±quartiles) when pulling
for a cooperator (cooperator treatment) was shorter than when pulling
for a partner that had not helped before (non-cooperator treatment).
b When pulling for a partner that had helped before, the median delay
was shorter (direct reciprocity) than when pulling for a new partner
after receiving help from others (generalised reciprocity)
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compatible with generous tit-for-tat (GTFT), which is one
of the direct reciprocity strategies found to establish
cooperation in game theory models of the iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma (Nowak and Sigmund 1994). A GTFT player
always cooperates after the partner cooperated, irrespective
of its own last move, and cooperates with a small proba-
bility after the partner defected. Our rats also pulled for a
partner that had not provided help before, but at a signif-
icantly lower frequency than for a cooperator. The pulling
rate for a non-cooperator was still higher than the pulling
rate of a rat that was alone in the experimental cage, i.e.
with no partner present (unpublished results). The rats
pulling for a non-cooperator might have been influenced by
the help experience they had received during the experience
phase (generalised reciprocity effect), as both the cooperator
and non-cooperator treatment were applied alternately.
In the second experiment, the helping behaviour of rats
after having received help was lower towards a new partner
than towards a known cooperator, although the received
amount of help had been the same in both treatments. This
shows that the effect of receiving help from a cooperator on
the propensity to help this individual in the future was not due
to generalised reciprocity. Such control against generalised
reciprocity was necessary because in a previous study, we
found that after receiving help from anonymous partners, the
propensity of Norway rats to help an unknown partner
increased by more than 20% (Rutte and Taborsky 2007).
Anonymous social experience has been found to influence
behavioural decisions also in the agonistic context (the
winner and loser effects; Hsu and Wolf 1999; Rutte et al.
2006), which also holds for Norway rats (S. Lehner, M.
Taborsky and C. Rutte, unpublished data). Note that the
pulling rates should not be compared between the first and
second experiment of this study, as the rats differed in their
individual pulling performance, and for the most part,
different individuals were used in both experiments (see
“Materials and methods”). However, within each experi-
ment, the propensity to help a previous cooperator increased
by 46.5 and 50.7% compared to the respective control
situations, which may be viewed as additional evidence that
direct reciprocity does generate higher levels of cooperation
in Norway rats than generalised reciprocity.
Our results suggest that rats remember cooperative
interactions with individuals and use this specific information
about a present partner in future interactions, if it is available
(direct reciprocity). This shows that rats may act similar to
primates in an instrumental cooperative task. Experimental
studies on food sharing in monkeys that used a similar setup
showed that cotton-top tamarins pulled more often for an
altruist (i.e. an individual that had pulled before although it did
not receive a reward for this action) than for a defector (that
never pulled; Hauser et al. 2003), and capuchin monkeys
shared food with a partner more readily who had cooperated
with them before (de Waal and Berger 2000). The capuchin
behaviour suggests that a positive attitude towards the
partner who had helped resulted in attraction, social tolerance
and a propensity to cooperate (de Waal 1997), which might
be a mechanism explaining the behaviour of Norway rats as
well (see Brosnan and de Waal 2002 for a discussion of
proximate mechanisms of reciprocal cooperation).
Direct reciprocity can only evolve if specific information
about a partner can be used or if individuals interact
exclusively with one partner for an extended period
(Dugatkin 1997). If the latter does not apply, direct
reciprocity involves individual recognition and specific
memory about previous interactions with individual partners.
For species lacking the cognitive abilities to either identify
all possible partners or to remember all relevant interactions
with different partners, cooperation based on specific social
information may be constrained. In rats, it has been
suggested that social and individual recognition is based on
olfactory cues (Gheusi et al. 1994). However, memory of the
identity of a conspecific in laboratory rats was reduced when
a third individual was introduced between interactions
(Burman and Mendl 2000). Thus, even if a species evolved
the ability to recognise conspecifics individually, memory
capacity may not always suffice to keep track of frequent
interactions with changing partners. In contrast, for general-
ised reciprocity to work, an individual needs to base its
future behaviour solely on social experience with any
member of a group (unspecific information). No higher
cognitive setup is necessary for this mechanism, but it may
be mediated by neurological or hormonal changes (Uvnas-
Moberg 1998; White and Hiroi 1998; Rilling et al. 2002;
Kosfeld et al. 2005). It remains an exciting challenge for
future studies to clarify how these and other physiological
mechanisms might differ between cooperative behaviour
based on direct and generalised reciprocity.
Our data show that Norway rats use individual-specific
(this study) and unspecific (Rutte and Taborsky 2007)
information when deciding to help a conspecific. If a
partner’s tendency to cooperate is known from previous
interactions, rats appear to make use of this information.
Using unspecific information if specific information is not
available may still be better than using no information.
According to this “hierarchical information hypothesis”, we
would expect that cooperative behaviour towards a partner
whose cooperative propensity is known is not influenced by
anonymous prior experience, as specific information can be
used. Only if such information is lacking should generalised
reciprocity be employed. Our results are consistent with this
prediction. Future studies should help to unravel whether
such hierarchical information processing is more generally
involved in decisions of animals to cooperate or not.
Importantly, the possibility to make use of any cooperation
experience (even if resulting from anonymous partners)
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should be incorporated also in studies of more specific
reciprocity mechanisms. Otherwise, the existence of direct
reciprocity cannot be unequivocally assumed if animals are
more likely to help a partner after having received help, even
if it was from this very individual. To our knowledge, this is
the first study that has taken care of this precaution.
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